THE CONCLUSION OF THE THEAETETUS

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This paper argues that the *Theaetetus* establishes conditions on objects of knowledge which seem to entail that only of Forms can there be knowledge. Plato's arguments for this will be shown valid. The principles needed to make Plato's premises true will turn out to have deep connections with important parts of Plato's over-all theory, and to have consequences which Plato, in the middle dialogues, seems to welcome on other grounds as well.

I. THE ARGUMENTS THAT FALSE JUDGMENT IS IMPOSSIBLE: PRELIMINARY SKETCHES

After arguing that Heracliteanism and Relativism are wrong as general theses about all entities whatsoever, and that perception has "no share of knowledge": Socrates turns to consider whether true judgment might be knowledge. The discussion of this hypothesis immediately breaks off for a long digression on how false judgment can be possible. Since the problems of accounting for false judgment are primarily problems about the nature of knowledge and reference, this "digression" is actually an integral part of the discussions of the conditions for knowledge.

Socrates first gets Theaetetus to agree that there is no judgment at all unless the judger knows the items about which he is judging. This amounts to the claim that to have a concept of an object which can be used for making judgments, the object must be known. Thus a theory of acquaintance must be a part of the theory of reference. But, it is argued, if the judger knows the items being judged it is incomprehensible that he can seriously mistake one item for the other. After a brief argument that non-beings cannot be objects of false judging, since all judgment has content, Socrates considers the suggestion that false judgment might derive from switching known components of the judgment. This suggestion is shown inadequate by a similar assertion that this kind of mistake is incomprehensible. If both components that are switched in the mistaken judgment are known to the judger, as they must be if he is to judge about them at all, then it is incomprehensible that they can be unknowingly switched. If an object is known by a judger, then the judger must know that it is not some other object.
Why does Plato believe that these “switching” mistakes are incomprehensible? The incomprehensibility of unknowingly switching concepts of different objects can be derived from a strong semantical principle about how concepts pick out their objects, to be discussed below. However, this semantical principle is really, for Plato, itself derived from its equivalence to a prima facie implausible account of knowledge. This paper will first connect the incomprehensibility of concept-switching from the semantical principle, then show that the semantical principle follows from a relational theory of knowledge, and then defend a relational theory of knowledge.

Consider first some strong consequences of the semantical principle that, for any concepts with distinct references, each concept’s content must match the properties of its respective referent. That is, reference is a function of sense. Now, for this theory to apply to singular terms for spatio-temporal individuals, the content of a concept must be quite rich, since it must determine its referent in the situations in which the world contains closely resembling items. In order to guarantee that matching between concept and object is close enough to determine reference in every possible case, there must be perfect match between concept and object. That is, for reference to be determined in general, the concept of an object must mean that object and not any other possible object, no matter how close another object might be in features. The descriptive content of a concept must not only be uniquely true of its referent, but must also single the object out in every possible world. Thus the match between concept and object must be too close to allow confusion of one concept with the other, except by carelessness. Let this semantical principle be called hereafter the “strong matching” principle.

Why must reference be determined in every possible case? Wittgenstein’s consideration that we must know what we mean independently of the facts would be a plausible support for such a view. The reference of a term, who or what we have in mind, should not depend on who or what else happens to exist. Let that perfect fit of concept to referent (or knowledge to object known) allows the possibility that here exists something else which fits the concept better. Thus the concept’s actual referent would only be such in virtue of the accident that a more perfectly-fitting case does not exist. Any imprecision or incompleteness in a concept is also impossible according to the “strong matching” principle, since the referent of the concept or piece of knowledge is a determinate piece of reality.

Thus the “strong matching” principle of reference has a certain plausibility on its own account as a semantical principle and would suffice to give Plato’s required result that concepts of distinct objects cannot be confused. However, Plato only appeals directly to this semantical principle in the discussion of the “true judgment with a logos” hypothesis. Plato’s reason for adopting the consequences of such a semantical principle is his acceptance of the claim that knowledge is a relation. It is argued below that the prima facie implausible principle that “knows” contexts are transparent entails the strong matching semantical principle. For Plato, the strong matching semantical principle for concepts used in knowledge is supported not by any plausibility in the semantical principle itself, but rather by the prima facie implausible premise that knowledge is a relation and so transparent.

It must first be shown that the transparency of “know” contexts entails the strong matching semantical principle in the case of concepts used in judgment. A context is said to be “transparent” if substitution of expressions with the same reference in that context preserves truth. If every description co-referential with “Reagan” can be substituted for “Reagan” in “Carter knows who Reagan is” while the truth value of the resulting sentence is the same as that of the original, then “...knows who...is” is said to create a transparent context. If Reagan is our century’s greatest president, then from the fact that Carter knows who Reagan is, it would follow that Carter knows who our century’s greatest president is. This means, then, that an object known under one individuating array of properties must be known under every individuating array of features. Since any feature of an object will be in some individuating array, any knowledge of a thing entails knowledge of every property of the thing. So, if an object must be known to be judged about, the concept we have when we judge must contain everything there is to know about the referent. Thus Plato considers physical things to be “both known and not known,” since, given the contingencies that infect the histories of sensible objects, the concepts we have of physical objects cannot be total. If knowledge must be total, non-total knowledge is either a contradiction in terms or a mixture of opposites.

Given these views of reference and knowledge, the incomprehensibility of mistakes follows. A person holding a false belief by switching concepts must, if he genuinely has concepts of distinct objects, identify by introspection concepts that are introspectively distinct. This can only happen by carelessness or inattention. The paradoxical conclusion drawn in the dialogue is that false judgment has no rational account. The other possible and perhaps Platonic conclusion is that there really are no concepts of objects or judgments about objects in cases where sincere false judgment is possible. Where false judgment is possible, there are partial, incomplete cases of knowledge and so partial, incomplete cases of judging. “False” concepts are required for false judging, which is unreal in the way false eyelashes are unreal. Plato implicitly draws this conclusion in his description of the problem of false judgment as that of finding an account of both knowing and not knowing the same object. As with every other phenomenon involving the sensible world, there is a mixture of opposites in knowledge of the physical world. Therefore, cases of “knowledge” in the sense world do not fit the definition of knowledge, but are still, in some sense, approximation which fall under the corresponding Form. Before proceeding to the Platonic justification for this view of knowledge as a relation, the remainder of Plato’s discussion of false belief will be
sketched:

The “wax tablet” account apparently departs from the semantic principles required by the above arguments by suggesting, not that a concept refer by resembling its referent, but rather that a concept refers to whatever is causally responsible for it. The wax tablet could be a model for reference and knowledge which was immune to transparency inferences and the requirement for perfect concepts. However, Plato does not use the full resources of the model. An account on which two concepts of the same object can be unrecognizable as such on “intrinsic” grounds would explain how knowledge of an object is compatible with mistakes about that object. Consider the variety of imprints an oddly shaped solid could make on successive drops onto a wax tablet. Deciphering which imprints came from which objects would not be trivial, just as it is not trivial which Fregean senses are senses of the same referent. Thus the wax tablet, with its implied causal criterion of acquaintance and reference, could provide a solution to the problem of how false judgment is possible.

However, the only differentiations Plato allows among different concepts of the same object are differentiations of clarity and depth. The referent of a concept is indeed not a function of its sense on the wax tablet model, but giving a model of “object under a different description” is not the point of the model. The “wax tablet”, as Plato uses it, fails to deal with cases in which distinct concepts of the same object are equally clear and deep, yet false judgment still can occur. The example Plato uses is a case of Twelve which is thought to be a case of Eleven even though our concepts of Eleven and Twelve are as clear and distinct as concepts get. If Twelve and Eleven were thought of as objects with innumerable features only some of which were reflected in a given “impression”, Plato could have handled this case by holding that some real relation analogous to “x was imprinted by y” constituted “x refers to y” and “x is acquainted with y in virtue of z’s state x”. For reasons dealt with in the next section, Plato does not think such a “causal contact” theory can be a correct account of reference or acquaintance.

The aviary analogy is another attempt to loosen the connection between reference and complete knowledge, by means of having an item be both known and not known. Plato supplies two senses of “knowing an object”: On the one hand, an object is known if an item of knowledge of it has at one time been captured and is being stored in the subject’s aviary. On the other hand, an item is said to be known if an item of knowledge of it is currently “in hand”. Both kinds of knowing can exist simultaneously, as when a familiar object is seen. Thus there can be distinct items of knowledge of, and so distinct concepts of, the same object, and thus the possibility of confusing one object with the other. For instance, the seen object can be identified with the wrong familiar object. However, once it is asked how these distinct concepts are to be confused, essentially the same problems arise as with simple misidentification. There are two ways of thinking of this misidentification, neither of which work. First, the subject can look in his aviary for a previously-captured item to match with his new captive, and get the wrong one. But how are we to understand his coming to believe that he has another concept of the same thing? His looking for a concept of that thing seems to require that he already have a concept by which to identify the concept sought. But then the problem is one of identifying introspectively distinct concepts. The second alternative supposes that there are false concepts (“pieces of unknowing”) in the aviary as well as real concepts. It is quite clear that this supposition assumes that the problem of how false judgment is possible has been solved. The aviary analogy seems to waver between an account of these pieces of knowledge and ignorance as concepts and as propositions. This apparent ambiguity is not important here, since a concept, according to Plato, contains so much information.

II. The Principle of the Above Argument

The above-described arguments are valid and, given Plato’s presuppositions, sound. Plato’s arguments start with the premise that knowledge of an object is required in order to have a concept of an object. Since knowledge of an object must be knowledge of every feature of the object in order to be knowledge at all, knowledge is a relation. That is, if an object is known, and the object is components x₁, x₂,..., and xn, then knowing the object is knowing x₁, x₂,..., and xn. If an object is known, the whole object is known. This apparently bizarre premise about knowledge, rather than semantic ideas about reference, seems to be the basis of the arguments about the incomprehensibility of mistakes. (The semantic notion is there also, of course, most explicitly in the final version of “account.”)” Knowledge is a relation of this kind has natural simplicity to recommend it, since, intuitively, objects are known and judged about rather than “aspects” or other non-concrete associates of objects. If we know Fred to be a frog, it is Fred who is known to be a frog, not an aspect of him. However, Plato’s motivation goes beyond such simplicities.

If knowledge is a relation, then knowledge-contexts are transparent. Anything that stands in a relation to an object stands in that relation to that object however that object is described. Suppose, then, that we know what we know about an object. That is, suppose that for every description of an object under which we know it, we know that we know it. Then mistakes would be indeed impossible just in virtue of the fact that knowledge is a relation and so referentially transparent. Plato’s grounds for holding that knowledge is a relation to an object, then, are in a way less important that his grounds for holding that knowledge of an object requires that we know a great deal of what we know. For Plato, not every fact about what we know will be something we know, but we will know every real feature of the things we know. The paradoxical consequence that no false judgment is possible comes from connecting the ideas that knowledge is a relation, that we know that we know a great deal of what
we know," and that we must know objects in order to judge about them.

To begin the argument that Plato has grounds for holding that knowledge is knowledge of every feature of a thing, consider briefly why some alternatives would be rejected:

1) The most extreme weakening of the Platonic criterion for knowledge of an object could be called the "one description" alternative. The one description alternative would say that knowledge of a single description picking out an individual would be sufficient for knowledge of that individual. That is, possession of any feature which is true of an object suffices for knowledge of the object. This is clearly inadequate.

2) Less obviously inadequate is the "one definite description" alternative. This would allow that an object is known if one description is available to the subject which is true only of the object. Thus a person who knew that there was one and only one queen of England could make judgments about the queen of England. But it is clear that having a definite description does not in general suffice to enable a person to make a judgment about an object, i.e., a judgment in which that object is the one the speaker "has in mind." For instance, intuitively, you do not know what worried Fred on February 5, 1983. However, you do have that description of his worry. Similarly, you do not know my maternal grandfather, even though you both know that he exists and can give indefinitely many definite descriptions of him.

3) Still another unacceptable alternative would claim that some special kind of contact with an object is necessary and sufficient for acquaintance with an object whether or not the knower has any correct descriptions of the object at all. This theory would treat acquaintance and reference as relations, while allowing propositional knowledge not to be a relation at all. That is, this theory puts no requirement on what we must know we know when we have knowledge of some object. Since no description is necessary for knowledge to exist, we can know an object and yet there may be no proposition about that object that we are in a position to assert to.

The special kind of contact required for this theory would be difficult to specify. It would be causal, but obviously not just any causal relation suffices for being acquainted with an object. If a stranger sends you a piece of junk mail, thus causally interacting with you, he remains a stranger. For Plato, it is clear that this alternative would be unacceptable and that knowing what something is requires knowing some propositions about the thing.

4) The most plausible non-Platonic temptation is to accept the claim that acquaintance is required in order to make a judgment about a thing but to analyze "acquaintance" in terms of some combination of causal history and descriptions known. Thus not every aspect of a known object need be known to the subject, which avoids the paradoxical consequences of making "knows" contexts transparent. The strategy would be to define what it is to know who something is in terms of some special sort of causal interaction together with some special kinds of descriptions. Thus there would be some descriptions of which a person could be ignorant while still knowing the individual, so the person would be in a position to judge mistakenly about the individual. The most thorough attempt to carry out this strategy is Boer and Lycan's "Knowing Who," which involves complex and interest-relative criteria, as well as leaving the causal relation an undefined primitive. Their essay tries to define knowing an object in terms of knowing the special kinds of propositions appropriate to the kind of object it is. Their account shows the propositional knowledge conditions to be quite complex even though they restrict themselves to the case of persons. Clearly, the propositions relevant to whether there is knowledge of numbers, cities, and directions are much different from those relevant to knowing persons. Such a theory seems most likely to capture the "use" of "knows" when it takes a direct object.

This tempting format is non-Platonic because it does not allow a simple and lawlike correlation between the conceptual order and ontology. For Plato, the soul and its principles and phenomena are fundamental principles with deep affinities with the structure of the world. Knowledge, along with action, are the fundamental natural relations between the soul and the world. Knowledge, being a fundamental natural phenomenon, must be an ontologically simple thing and a theoretically simple notion. Nothing thus so ontologically important could have as arbitrarily unsystematic a basis as what Boer and Lycan describe. No important feature of the world or of world-mirroring mind can be so unintelligible.

A characterization of the descriptions and contacts constituting acquaintance which would capture ordinary intuitions would vary unrecursively and unsystematically from case to case. Matching such intuitions and usage would make acquaintance unintelligible.

Plato is moved by scientific considerations to reject complicated accounts of acquaintance. His taking an extreme position on conditions for knowing objects is analogous to the Middle Dialogues' extreme position on conditions for being. The reality of ordinary sensible objects is rejected because Plato holds that there are no clear and simple criteria for survivable intrinsic changes. That is, no definition of the being of sensible things can be constructed on an intelligible basis. Aristotle's account of the distinction between essence and accident, if it were construed as the definition of "Being" as a feature of sensible objects, would be a melange of conditions and exceptions. In the same way, ordinary cases in which an object would be said to be known are rejected. Just as only changeless things are (strictly) beings, so only totally known things are (strictly) known.

On this way of understanding the Middle Dialogues, Plato rejects the ordinary view that sensible objects are lasting beings in space and time primarily because the criteria for when such an object has ceased to be
as opposed to when an object has merely altered are so unclear and variable between types of case. The Heracleiteanism of the Middle Dialogues is a consequence of the view that no domain of objects could have an account involving the murky array of necessary and sufficient conditions for each kind of object that seems to be required. An account of a real domain would rather be a simple account of the application of a simple feature, Being. After all, these entities all exist in virtue of Being, which is what the account must be attempting to define. The division for various cases between accidental and essential properties, which is required to preserve the “beings” of common sense, is not systematic enough to be a physically real property. Surely, Being must be a simple notion, since it is the most fundamental natural feature. For Plato, a realist, principles of being and knowledge are physical laws. Just as we do not accept complex and arbitrary fundamental physical laws, so Plato does not accept complex and arbitrary patterns of usage whose accommodation would mean that the application-conditions of his basic theoretical concepts were unintelligible. And just as the physicist need not complicate his theory in order to cover every use of “force”, so Plato need not complicate relations among Forms to capture uses of “know” or of “is.”

The same kind of requirement which led him to accept a kind of Heracleiteanism for the physical world inclined Plato against analyzing “knowing” as partial acquaintance with objects. Plato cannot allow that a subject knows who someone is, and thus can make a judgment about him, if there are some special descriptions under which he can identify him or some special causal relation between the subject and the person. Since not every description will do, and since the specification of the descriptions which will satisfy “ordinary language” or intuitive practice varies unsystematically from case to case, no philosophical sense can be made of anything short of “total knowledge” of an entity as a requirement for being able to have some individual in mind. That is, since no selection of descriptions or causal relations makes philosophical sense, knowledge of an object must be a relation to that object, and thus knowledge and acquaintance contexts must be transparent, at least when real features of objects are mentioned in the substituted descriptions.

An extreme version of the semantical principle that the content of a concept determines its reference follows immediately from this account of knowledge. If we have concepts only of what we know or are acquainted with, and if knowledge must be total, then the content of a concept must totally and perfectly fit its object. Thus a condition of adequate acquaintance for a person to have a concept of an object is that every real fact about that object be known by that person. (“Every real fact” is discussed in the next section.) Where this condition is not met, there is a mixture of opposites—knowing and not knowing, judging and not judging, and so forth. In no mixed case are there real instances of either knowledge or judgment. False judgment is only possible which “judgment” is understood as only quasi-applying. Thus there literally is no false judgment. In the sensible world and in relation to the sensible world, all instances are quasi-instances which do not fit the real nature or definition of what they are quasi-instances of, and so do not have a real nature or real being at all.

III. Only of Forms Can There Be Knowledge

Any genuine concept of a sensible object would contain as part every real fact about that object. Since sensible objects have indefinitely large numbers of properties throughout their histories, some of which properties depend on states of other sensibles, and since items in these multiplicities are not predictable on the basis of some finite subset of these properties, there can be no real concepts of sensible objects. Since “knows” creates a transparent context and all aspects of an object are known if any are, we cannot be acquainted with objects which have an unsystematic and indefinite number of aspects. Thus any object with contingent, temporal properties which are not deducible from a finite set (i.e. any object capable of having accidents, in Aristotelian terms) cannot be an object of real acquaintance. So no sensible object can be an object of knowledge, since judgment requires acquaintance. Judgment cannot strictly be about sensible objects.

The consequence is that only Forms can be known, i.e. that the only case of unmixed knowing is knowledge of a Form. (This is not to say that all knowledge of Forms is unmixed knowledge.)

It follows from the above considerations that only objects all of whose real properties and relations form a finite or recursively structured set can be known, since one can only be acquainted with objects whose total nature is knowable. The Forms, which have on other grounds been claimed to be the really intelligible objects, have exactly the features that any possible object of real acquaintance has been shown to require. According to Plato, there is a limited or systematically organized world of Forms whose totality can be grasped in a single insight.

All blending relations among Forms must be grasped in order to have acquaintance with any Form. Since Forms are non-temporal, their blending relations with each other are the only relations that are part of their nature. Thus Forms are knowable, and so intelligible, because all there is to know about them can be known.

How is it that Plato can preserve even knowledge of the Forms, given that there are open sentences which pick out forms in terms of transient and unpredictable phenomena? This is the same problem as that of explaining how the being of Forms is preserved in the face of changes in these transient relations. For instance, “is contemplated by Carter” is only contingently and transiently satisfied by the Form Justice. If this were a real feature and its transience a real change in Justice, Justice could neither be nor be known.

Plato is a strong realist about what properties and relations there are.
Such entities are not guaranteed to exist on semantical grounds alone, but are posited as explanatory scientific entities. Thus Plato is not committed to the existence of a property or relation corresponding to every open sentence formulable in Attic Greek. Since Forms are immutable, open sentences transiently true of Forms do not name real features of the Forms.

The relation of feature to object, for Plato, can be understood on the model of the relation of part to whole. A feature must in some sense be a component of the object, as is made clear in the final discussions of "true judgment with a logos", especially the discussions of letters and syllables. Thus a kind of mereological essentialism gives another reason that the transparency of "knows" contexts is to be restricted to real features. To know an object is to know the whole object. An object with an unknown part is unknown since that part is essential to that object's being.

Mereological essentialism, combined with the conception of features as parts of objects, allows Plato a distinction among open sentences true of objects which differs from Aristotle's distinction between essence and accident. Aristotle distinguishes among real intrinsic features of entities. For Plato, every real intrinsic feature of an entity is part of its Being, so that knowing that being requires knowing that it has that feature. An open sentence which is true of an object but which does not state part of what an object is, is not a feature of that object at all. So mere relations such as being admired by Fred are not part of Alice and may not be known when Alice is known. Knowledge is still a relation to an object, on this account. When we know Alice, we know someone who is admired by Fred, but we do not know that we do so.

Plato makes this invidious distinction among open sentences just before he discusses the relational nature of sensible things. In this passage, he asserts that some changes in what is true of an object are not really coming-to-be of anything about the object, since the object remains the same as itself both before and after it satisfies the open sentence. Of course the notion of "remaining equal to itself" through this kind of transient event cannot be the independent criterion for being an open sentence whose satisfaction does not change the object. Plato seems to be just asserting that there are such pseudo-properties which do not describe real properties of objects. Such pseudo-features make "knows" contexts not quite transparent, for Plato, or at least restrict our access to what we know, in some sense.

IV. THE CONCLUSION OF THE THEAETETUS

What does the Theaetetus as a whole say, according to the above interpretation? The first section of the dialogue says that perception cannot have anything to do with knowledge and that sensing can therefore at best only supply components for knowledge claims. The second section says that only of Forms can there be knowledge even as components, since only objects whose nature is finite or recursive can have a knowable total nature. The last section deals with the hypothesis that knowledge is true judgment with an account. The following is a sketch of the interpretation the above approach to the dialogue would generate.

Plato first establishes that "logos" as analysis into elements will not define knowledge whether the parts in question are knowable or unknowable. A whole is nothing above all it parts, on the one hand, and known parts do not help establish a definition of knowledge. Three versions of what "logos" might mean are rejected. First, "logos" as any description will not do because description is too easy—not every description counts as knowledge. This discussion is evidence for the Platonic requirements discussed above that knowledge of an object requires total knowledge of the features of an entity. Second, "logos" as being able to state elements of a thing does not suffice for knowledge of a thing, by the application of the very transparency argument discussed in this paper. Third, "logos" as an individuating description, has also been discussed at some length. Plato's objection is that mere true judgment already requires this kind of logos, so the analysis is redundant.

If we take Forms to be real objects of knowledge, the grounds for the rejection of the analysis of knowledge as true judgment with a logos should not be taken as final. The point of the last section of the dialogue is that real judgment requires an account and by itself is in fact the same thing as knowledge, since a concept adequate for judgment contains every element of the nature of the object. The supposed counterexamples to the claim that knowledge is true judgment are not strictly cases of judgment at all. Total knowledge, furthermore, requires that all nature-determining relations be known. Thus true, real judgment involves a total account—the kind of account Plato goes on to give in the Sophist. There is the problem that to know one Form one would have to know them all, so that real knowledge of one Form would require simultaneous grasp of them all. But this is not an un-Platonic notion.

Thus Plato claims that none of our ordinary judgments are real judgments and none of our concepts are concepts and none of our acquaintances are really acquaintances. The air of paradox this generates can be somewhat diminished by realizing that in and in relation to the sensible world, there are only quasi-instances of Forms, that is, cases explained by the Forms which fail to fit the definition of the Form. Knowledge and Judgment are Forms whose instances in and in relation to the sensible world will fail to fit the real nature of what they are instances of. Sensible phenomena are quasi-instances by being mixtures of opposites. Failure to fit the nature of knowledge makes an instance of knowledge both knowledge and not knowledge. Only in relation to Forms can our quasi-instances of knowledge become, by closer and closer approximation, real instances, since only Forms are in principle knowable.
NOTES

5. This terminology is Quine’s, from *Word and Object*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960).
6. Plato restricts transparency to real properties and relations of the objects in question. Plato holds, not that every open sentence uniquely picking out an object will be known if any is known, but rather that every real component of the object is known if the object is. For Plato, knowledge is a relation to an object, but only what is really a part of that object is required to be known by someone who knows the object. The reasons Plato holds this, as well as the evidence that he does, are discussed below.
7. *Theaetetus* 196c8, for instance.
12. Cf. 202 ff., where Plato argues that knowing a whole must be knowing its parts.
14. One could hold that knowledge contexts were transparent, but that there was no connection with knowing and knowing that one knows. This would deprive the notion of knowledge of much of its interest. Plato seems to hold, about temporal and other accidents of things, not that there are parts of what we know which we do not know we know, but that these phenomena are unknowable.
15. The idea that a judgment directed at an entity is part of what is operating here, since this directedness is analyzed in terms of intrinsic features of the concept.
17. From the *Cratylus* and analogous passages in the *Theaetetus*, I take Plato to hold that Heraclitus is in some sense correct about the sensible world. This is not to deny that a sensible object can be a structure which endures through some changes. However, since more than one sensible structure is present in an intuitive sensible object, (e.g. a red cube), there is no saying when that object has ceased to exist.
18. Presumably, the knowledge most people have about Justice, Beauty, etc., is mixed knowledge and unknowledge of Forms.
21. “Mereological Essentialism” is defined and defended by Roderick Chisholm in *Person and Object*, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1976), Appendix B.
23. See the discussion in footnote 14.

24. In the *Parmenides*, it seems, Plato comes to hold that this “mixture of opposites” feature of the sensible world infects the Forms also, so that there are no “pure cases” of such characters as Unity, for instance. As the *Theaetetus* is being written, Plato is still struggling with the problems of analysis yielded by the supposition that even a Form is not an unmixed case of the character it brings about in the world.