TGI($\phi$) Day!

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q</th>
<th>A</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Where?</td>
<td>Nathan Hale ‘Pub’</td>
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<tr>
<td>When?</td>
<td>4pm–6pm; Friday 16 Feb 07</td>
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<td>Why?</td>
<td>Potential theses to be discussed . . .</td>
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- that there are no ordinary, macro-sized objects\(^1\)
- that classical logic is the logic of ‘true’\(^2\)
- that ethical properties are unnatural (and, hence, non-physical)\(^3\)
- that you are an arbitrary object\(^4\)
- that the mind is non-physical\(^5\)
- that knowledge does not entail truth\(^6\)
- that proper names are not rigid\(^7\)
- that naturalism is a misguided stance\(^8\)
- that constitution is identity\(^9\)

\(^1\) Argument: if there were ordinary, macro-sized objects, then there’d be ordinary objects. The likelihood of any contingent object coming into existence is miniscule, and so anything that actually exists is extraordinary. So, there are no ordinary objects, and so no ordinary, macro-sized objects.

\(^2\) Argument: what else could it be?!

\(^3\) Argument: smart, sincere philosophers have long been deeply puzzled by ethical properties. Nobody puzzles over things that they find perfectly natural. So, ethical properties are unnatural.

\(^4\) Argument: let $x$ be an arbitrary object. Hence, $x$ is arbitrary. Given that $x$ was arbitrary, we conclude that everything is arbitrary, by universal generalization. Hence, by universal instantiation, you are arbitrary.


\(^6\) Argument: you know yourself, but your self isn’t truth. Hence, you can know something without it being true. Whence, knowledge doesn’t entail truth.

\(^7\) Argument: a name is rigid just if it denotes the same thing at all worlds where that thing exists. Consider a world $w$ in which there’s no language but in which Max exists. Since there’s no language at $w$, Max has no name at $w$, and hence ‘Max’ doesn’t name Max at $w$. Hence, ‘Max’, which is a proper name, is not rigid. Hence, proper names, in general, are not rigid.

\(^8\) Argument: if, per naturalism, everything is natural, then there’d be nothing unnatural in the world. But that there’s nothing unnatural in the world is terribly surprising, and indeed unnatural. Hence, naturalism is self-defeating. QED (Cf. argument on ethical properties.)

\(^9\) Argument: without loss of generality, consider a toy made of exactly one indivisible, $w$-inhabiting block (where $x$ is $w$-inhabiting iff $x$ exists at and only at $w$). The toy is clearly identical with the block of which it is made. QED